TY  - JOUR
T1  - an Analysis of the Pboc'S New Mobile Payment Regulation
A1  - Liu, Andrew
Y1  - 2019///
KW  - 81394:Political Organizations
KW  - Beggars
KW  - China
KW  - Citizens
KW  - Communism
KW  - Communist parties
KW  - Companies
KW  - Competition
KW  - Competitive advantage
KW  - Competitors
KW  - Consumer protection
KW  - Consumers
KW  - Consumption
KW  - Entrepreneurs
KW  - Entrepreneurship
KW  - Expenditures
KW  - Fraud
KW  - Habits
KW  - Incentives
KW  - Innovations
KW  - Investigations
KW  - Market shares
KW  - Mobile commerce
KW  - Money laundering
KW  - Offenders
KW  - Offenses
KW  - Payments
KW  - Policy networks
KW  - Political Science
KW  - Political parties
KW  - Political power
KW  - Politics
KW  - Power
KW  - Proprietary
KW  - Regulation
KW  - Rents
KW  - Social systems
KW  - Transactions
JF  - Cato Journal
VL  - 39
IS  - 1
SP  - 87
EP  - 98
UR  - https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/analysis-pbocs-new-mobile-payment-regulation/docview/2189948997/se-2
L1  - file:///E:/jurnal/2023/j of economics and business/paper/Andrew 2019 AN_ANALYSIS_OF_THE_PBOC'S_NEW_.pdf
N2  - In 2016 alone, China saw $9 trillion in mobile payments-in contrast to a comparably small $112 billion of mobile payments in the United States (Abkowitz 2018). The use of mobile payment systems such as Alipay and WeChat Pay are widespread in China, with users ranging from beggars to lenders to criminals. Previously, the mobile payments landscape was largely untouched and unregulated by the Chinese government because of its relative insignificance in the Chinese economy. However, with the explosive growth in mobile payment transactions, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) implemented a new mobile payment regulation on June 30, 2018. Most notably, the government will require all mobile payments to be cleared through the PBOC, and hence, all mobile payment transactions will begin to touch the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Hersey 2017).The PBOC's stated reasoning for implementing this regulation is to curb money laundering and fraud. While those are valid concerns, it is unlikely that there are not additional motivations for the new regulation. In this article, I analyze the effects this new regulation has had and will likely have on the various mobile payment system stakeholders, competitors, and users, and also uncover what underlying motives the PBOC has in implementing the regulation.Previous literature has analyzed the security of Chinese mobile payment networks and competition, regulation, and innovation in the mobile payment industry, but no formal literature has been written to this point analyzing the PBOC's new mobile payment regulation. Liu (2015) takes a deep dive into Alipay's user service agreement and analyzes its security; Liu, Kauffman, and Ma (2015) investigate how regulation affects innovation and competition between mobile payment platform providers. This article adds to the existing literature by analyzing the observed and probable effects of the PBOC's new mobile payment regulation.In this article, I find that China's new mobile payment regulation gives the government access to the proprietary user data of mobile payment giants and will not improve mobile payment security. Instead, the new regulation will compromise the incentives of mobile payment providers and funnel mobile payment transactions into more illicit and unsecure channels.
ER  -