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Discourses of the Anti-Indonesian Communist Party and Its Reproduction in High School Textbooks during the New Order (1967-1998)

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This research aims to study the discourse of the anti-Indonesian Communist Party (ICP) and its reproduction in high school history textbooks. The questions posed are: (1) How did the army historiographies describe itself and the ICP as its competitor? (2) How did the anti-ICP discourses spread through high school history textbooks? To answer these research questions, this study employs a binary opposition approach developed by Derrida. The results suggest that the army represented itself as the victim and became the target of ICP's cruelty. On the contrary, the ICP was stigmatized as the mastermind of G30S's coup d'état, demonized as a cruel party, and also indulged in free sex. The army discourses spread into high school textbooks during the New Order regime (1967-1998). This resulted in many Indonesians believing that the ICP was the mastermind behind G30S as any narrative was accused to be a political movement to revive the ICP.

Key words: *Indonesian Communist Party, the army, history textbook, political competition, G30S.*

Introduction

Since the fall of President Suharto's authoritarian government in 1998, studies on the September 30, 1965 movement, which is famous with its acronym G30S, have flourished. One aspect that received current international attention was the massacre of civilians by the religious



militias and the army (Melvin, 2018). An estimated 500 thousand to one million people were killed without any judicial process, and many more were arrested and jailed. Even their spouses and children suffered because of the social and political discrimination by the New Order government (Robinson, 2018). The question, “who was the intellectual actor behind the movement,” remains a mystery to this day. Zurbuchen (2002) mapped the G30S research into five scenarios: the Indonesian Communist Party (ICP), competition and internal conflicts of the army, the coup by Suharto, Sukarno's game, and the operation of Western intelligence.

From these five scenarios, the ICP as the G30S' mastermind produced by the army has the most widespread influence in Indonesia. People believe that the ICP is the main actor behind the G30S. Therefore, every new narrative that did not refer to the ICP as the G30S' mastermind always received negative responses and raised a controversy. In 2004, the Department of Education tried to alter the ICP's involvement in G30S in school textbooks on the basis of recent academic research; however, a few hardliner Moslem organizations, supported by retired army leaders, rejected this move. They came to schools and swept out the new history textbooks. Some Islamic leaders such as Fadli Zon, Taufiq Ismail, and Yusuf Hasyim came to the House of Representatives and questioned why there was no mention of the ICP involvement in the 2004 curriculum (Utami, 2014).

The resistance also occurred when the Joko Widodo administration (2014-2019) tried to resolve the human rights violations of the 1966-1967 massacres of people who were accused to be ICP members and sympathizers. On April 18-19, 2016, the government held a symposium to encourage reconciliation through the disclosure of the 1965 tragedy from the victims' perspective (Hermansyah, 2016). The anti-ICP factions, hardliner Moslems and army retirees, rejected and stigmatized the symposium as a sign of the renaissance of the ICP. They stated that the massacre had been carried out and there was no reason to apologize as it had been done to save the country. They even held a counter-symposium by presenting army figures and Islamic clerks who discussed how the ICP deserved to be banned in Indonesia (Artharini, 2016).

The strong influence of the anti-ICP discourse is the result of indoctrination by the New Order government and the army. Through its power, they produced and distributed a discourse that the ICP was uncivilized, cruel and used various devious methods to achieve its goals (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981). Besides writing the official historical account of the G30S, the government also built various museums housing ICP cruelty dioramas and monuments of the six generals who were killed. One of the famous museums is the Sacred Pancasila Monument in the Lubang Buaya area. During the New Order era, on October 1, each year, also called the Sacred Pancasila Day, the monument was used to commemorate the day the army triumphed against the ICP (McGregor, 2002). Although the New Order has collapsed, the commemorative service continues to be held every year.



The propaganda of the anti-ICP discourses was also carried out through history lessons at school. From elementary to high school, students are taught the G30S narrative to hate the ICP and glorify the army. Borrowing Apple's opinion, the narrative and its discourse are official knowledge (Apple, 1993). It has to be taught to students as credible knowledge, to help in developing good citizens.

Various forms of representation produced by the government make the anti-ICP a grand narrative discourse in Indonesian history. Historical studies on the G30S at the local and national levels that produce counter-discourses are almost impossible because access to primary sources at the National Archives is closed. At the international level, Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey raised a counter-discourse. They found that the ICP was not the mastermind of G30S (Andersons & McVey, 2009). The study became public knowledge after Joseph Kraft reported it through *The Washington Post* on March 5, 1966 (Adam, 2018). In response, the Indonesian government through Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, two military historians from the Institute of History of the Defense and Security Department, published *The coup attempt of the September 30 Movement in Indonesia* (1968), which was a revision and translation of a book titled, *The 40 Day Failure of the G30S* (Notosusanto & Saleh, 1968).

Academic research reveals that there are many perspectives. The discourse on anti-ICP is only one of them and it is not academic research; it is viewed more as a political struggle between Lieutenant General Suharto and the army. From this perspective, the demonization of the ICP is an effort to bring down rivals and gain political power. To understand the army's efforts in overthrowing the ICP from the political scene, this study tries to investigate the historiographical narratives produced in 1965. This study focuses on the use of historiographical narrative by the army against the ICP and other parties deemed as rivals, as well as its reproduction in high school textbooks during the New Order period when Suharto and the army ruled for more than 30 years.

Based on the complex problems above, the research questions posed are:

1. How did the army historiography describe themselves and the ICP as the other?
2. How did the anti-ICP discourse spread out throughout the high school history textbooks?

Methodology

To answer the first question posed above, the research conducted a documentary study on the historiography published from October to December 1965. There are at least three books that can be the object of study. The first is "*Fakta-Fakta Persoalan Sekitar Gerakan 30 September*" (Facts on the September 30 movement), which was released by the army Information Centre



(Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965). This book was a compilation of three special publications. The first was published on October 5, 1965, a few days after the G30S, while the second edition was published in November 1965, and the third in December 1965. Because the content is the official publication of the Army Information Centre, this book is positioned to be the Armed Force's official opinion on the G30S. The second book is *The Decisive Moments About the Subversive Betrayal of the September 30th movement* (NN, 1965). Although there is no name for the author, this book contains many official statements, including speeches and daily orders from the Indonesian National Army in response to G30S. Therefore, despite its anonymity, the document was believed to be academically credible and written by those very close to the army. Considering its content, it is unsurprising that Google books then addresses Suharto as the contributor. The third is “40 Hari Kegagalan G-30-S” (The 40 Day Failure of the G30S), which was released by the Institute of history, the Department of Défense and Security. This book was published in December 1965 and was written by military historians from the Department of Défense and Security, under Nugroho Notosusanto's leadership (Lembaga-Sedjarah-DEPHANKAM, 1966).

The study examines anti-ICP discourses in the history lessons of textbooks used in high schools. The textbooks in this study are defined as schoolbooks that are authoritatively very important and necessary for high school students to study the history of Indonesia (Philpott, 2000). During the New Order administration, the Department of Education renewed the curriculum three times: in 1975, 1984, and 1994. To arrive at a comprehensive understanding, this study used three textbooks for each curriculum period, with a note, that one particular textbook was used across two curriculum periods: 1975 and 1984.

To analyse the historical narrative, this study used a hermeneutic approach. Using Dilthey's perspective, a historian strives to understand historical phenomenon as texts relating to one's life experiences and expressions (Dilthey, 1977). Understanding a historical event is to revive or embody an inner experience. From this perspective, the hermeneutic approach enables me to analyse the anti-ICP historical narration produced in 1965 to understand its writers' subjective expression, particularly in relation to their power interest (Wodak & Meyer, 2006).

Positioning the anti-ICP narrative as a “subjective expression” of power interest makes the analysis of the contextual meaning of a text possible. The analysis is to capture the assumption and ideology concealed in the text (Crawford, 2001). From this viewpoint, the text delivers the writer's perspective to audience through chosen terms, sentences, and phrases.

Based on Derrida's (1997) theory of binary opposition, messages on a text have two conflicting poles: superior and inferior. Superior terms used to represent the interest, group by describing themselves and their opinions, especially their positive attitudes. Spivak explained that the



superior term represents not only the object of particular knowledge but also the object of a vision (Spivak, 1977).

Conversely, inferior terms represent the others who are not in line, or maybe conflicting, with the writers' interests. From this perspective, inferior terms express negative opinions or negate others. The negation can be represented by blaming, criminalizing, or demonizing others who do not support the interest group. By using Derrida's binary opposition theory, the narrative could be identified and analysed to understand how the army describes itself and the others.

Result

Self-description of the army

The army described itself as an institution that was very loyal to the State; however, it was treated unfairly and even became the victim of fraud. Self-description is, among others, conveyed by Ibnu Subroto, the chief of the Army's Information Centre (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965). He said that terror propagated by the G30S has led to a situation of national mourning, as well as to heartbreak in every member of the army. From this viewpoint, the army described itself as the victim of the G30S, which resulted in the army losing its best leaders, the six generals: Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, Major General Raden Soeprapto, Major General Mas Tirtodarmo Haryono, Major General Siswondo Parman, Brigadier General Donald Isaac Panjaitan, and Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswodiharjo. Already an apparent victim of the G30S terror, the army also described itself as a victim of the establishment and the rumours of the Generals' Council. The army was accused of establishing a Generals' Council and of planning a coup d'état on October 5, 1965.

Besides representing themselves as the victim, the army also presented itself as the saviour of Indonesia from many evil parties. The rescue measure was conducted in two stages. First, Major General Suharto took over as the army's highest commander. That measure was legitimized with an excuse that many top leaders of the army had been kidnapped and their fate was not known yet. Therefore, Suharto, as the Commander of Strategic Reserve Command, was considered to be the one most deserving to take over the ad interim leadership of the army (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965).

The second measure taken was to destroy the G30S's power in the military operation. In this stage, Suharto was represented as a hero who could paralyse the opponent's power quickly. It was suggested that the situation in Jakarta (capital of Indonesia) was critical because a few strategic centres, such as the radio and telecommunication centre, were occupied by the G30S. Having taken over the army's leadership, Suharto then contacted troops supporting the G30S. Two battalions joined the army: Battalion 454 and Battalion KK II KKO Cakrabirawa (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965).



The next operation targets were the Radio of Republic Indonesia (RRI) and Telecommunication Centre buildings. It was revealed that at 19:00 hrs, the Army Commando Regiment was instructed to release the two buildings. The Telecommunication Center and RRI were successfully seized within twenty minutes (Lembaga-Sedjarah-DEPHANKAM, 1966). The final operation was to find the army leaders who were kidnapped from the Lubang Buaya area. From the army's viewpoint, the area was under Halim Perdana Kusuma Air Force Base's rule. The corpses of the army leaders were found in a discarded well (NN, 1965).

The Army's Description of the Indonesian Communist Party

There are at least three institutions that considered having different positions with the army, but this article will focus on the Indonesian Communist Party (ICP). The ICP is considered not only different by the army but also to be opposing. To give a discourse of the opposition firmly, the ICP is represented as a political party that wanted to substitute Pancasila with communist ideology through violence. On the other hand, the army described itself as the defender of Pancasila from the threats of the ICP. In contrast, the ICP description as an antagonistic actor is found among many others in the army's narration of the G30S. The narrative produced a discussion that the ICP was the main actor of G30S and the movement was a coup d'état. This discussion was supported by the fact that on the morning of October 1, 1965, RRI Jakarta broadcast an announcement by a movement, called the G30S led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the Battalion Commander I of *Cakrabirawa*, of the presidential guard (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965). The movement would establish a national board named the Board of Indonesian Revolution. The announcement was interpreted by the army as a coup d'état. A clear statement of the army presented in Major General Suharto's speech was broadcast through RRI on October 2. He said that the establishment of the board was a sign that they intended to take over the State's rule, and planned to overthrow President Sukarno's administration (NN, 1965).

This was the first instance in Indonesian history when a movement was categorized as a coup d'état by the army. Usually, the decision is made in a cabinet meeting led by the President. For example, to decide whether to designate the Madiun affair that happened in 1948 as a coup d'état, President Sukarno and Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta held a cabinet meeting (Poeze, 2011). From this perspective, the army decision toward G30S can be considered more as a political manoeuvre than a legal decision. The intention was to make a deadly hit against its main political enemy, the ICP. In the beginning, the army did not state firmly that the ICP was the actor of the G30S. The production of discourse at that time was *Pemuda Rakyat* (the People's Youth) and *Gerakan Wanita Indonesia* (*Gerwani* /Indonesia Women Movement), the two wing organizations of the ICP, involved in G30S. They were trained in military skills by Air Force instructors at Lubang Buaya where the army leaders' corpses were found.



In the army's narration, the word ICP is mentioned while discussing the issue of the Generals Council, rather than in the outline of the G30S. It was explained that the ICP and its sister organizations produced a discourse that the G30S was the army's internal problem. Furthermore, it was outlined that they accused that the Generals Council would orchestrate a coup d'état on October 5, 1965 (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965).

From the two statements, the involvement of ICP's sister organizations and ICP's accusation against the Generals Council, the army indirectly put the ICP in the main vortex of the G30S. The stigmatization could be seen more clearly in the narration of Lubang Buaya as the intensive practice centre related directly to the kidnapping of the army leaders. The army views itself as the most compact unit and the main obstacle for ICP in implementing its political plan (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965, pp. 16-17).

To confirm its stigmatization as an antagonist, the ICP used the slogan "the unity of the Nationalist, Religions, Communist," which was initiated by President Sukarno to achieve its own goals. ICP's policies were represented as though they supported the Indonesian revolution and were loyal to Sukarno, but in fact they displayed their thirst for power. They were more brutal over time and used some slogans, which terrified the people who still had morals and ethics (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965, p. 17).

The discourse of ICP as the main actor of G30S can be seen more clearly in the book published by the army's History Center in late 1965. The book explains that G30S was not a spontaneous event, but deliberately planned. Referring to the result of the interrogation with Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the book from its first paragraph narrates that the ICP is the mastermind of the G30S. Furthermore, the book stated that the movement was planned through intensive meetings between Untung and Kamaruzaman, called Sam, from the Central Committee of the ICP as the main intellectual actor (Lembaga-Sedjarah-DEPHANKAM, 1966, pp. 11-14).

Jakarta as the Discourse Battlefield

Information is very important to people because it is the source of one's thoughts and beliefs. In 1965, the army's Information Centre understood the importance of information, and thus attempted to process and utilize information to support its interest. Even Brigadier General Ibnu Suroto, as the Head of the Army's Information Centre Staff, mentioned that his institution was "troop info" or information troops (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965, p. 5). According to him, narration around the G30S event was viewed as a battlefield, a discourse war. He stated that the army was fighting against the Generals Council and the opinion that the G30S was an internal problem. Furthermore, he explained that the accusation thrown by a certain group about the army 'Generals' Council,' that it would attempt a coup d'état on October 5, is an insult against the army's purity, because actually there never was and would



never be a Generals Council. Also, certain Indonesian politicians (ICP) stated that the fact that G30S was an internal problem of the army was unacceptable as it was in contradiction with reality (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965, p. 6).

The analytical narration of the Army's Information Centre also reveals that they rejected the discourse of G30S as an internal problem of the army. By explaining that the statement contradicted the fact that the movement is politically orientated, relieving President Sukarno's administration and stating that the supreme rule is in the hands of the Board of Revolution that they had established (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965, p. 15).

Viewed through binary opposition, the army was in opposition to the ICP and the Air Force. From this perspective, the army understood that the discourse battle in Jakarta (Capital of Indonesia) was to fight against the two powers.

To win the battle in the capital Jakarta, the army, through the Military Regional Commander of Jakarta Raya, Umar Wirahadikusumah, issued a writ to the Jakarta regional police No: 01 Drt/10/1965 to take the following actions: (1) control all offset companies; (2) prohibit any publication without permission from the Military Regional Commander of Jakarta Raya; and (3) conduct physical safeguard (build safeguarding posts) particularly for the *Berita Yudha* (The War Reportage Newspaper) offset located in the Gatep Kota corridor, and the *Harian Angkatan Bersenjata* (The Army Daily) offset in Petojo to enable the offset to work optimally (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965, pp. 48-49). From this viewpoint, the prohibition against many publication businesses prevented the distribution of different discourses. On the other hand, people acquired only information discoursing on the army's interest through the two newspapers. In other words, the writ issued by Umar Wirahadikusumah was intended to ensure that the army would win the battle.

The next step was to destroy the power of the ICP. The accusations focused on demonizing the ICP by exploiting the army leaders' murders. There were at least two accusations. The first was that members of the ICP sister organizations (*Pemuda Rakyat* and *Gerwani*) had behaved very cruelly with the bodies of the army leaders. The cruelty was described as having exceeded the limits of humanity. It was reported that every volunteer who lived in the Lubang Buaya barracks was equipped with a small dagger and razor blade to carry out the torture. They not only slashed the bodies of the highly respected Generals in the army but even slashed and cut their genitals (Drakeley, 2007).

In addition to the atrocities of the ICP, the army also produced and distributed reports that members of the two ICP wing organizations had displayed immoral behaviour. Before being cut into pieces, the *Gerwani* members were instructed to play with the genitals of the Generals. Sex parties with free sex between members of *Gerwani* and *Pemuda Rakyat* were depicted



every day. Starting with the women dancing naked, each member of *Gerwani* had sex with 4 *Pemuda Rakyat* (Drakeley, 2007).

The portrayal of *Gerwani* and *Pemuda Rakyat* as very cruel, immoral and even as a barbaric people was intended to portray the ICP as an evil political party, which not only wanted to replace Pancasila as the state's foundation with Communism, but teach topics that are contrary to religious teachings and community norms.

The army also compiled a narrative that the G30S was a long-planned political movement. It explained that since 1962 the ICP had formulated the slogan "brave once again brave" to encourage its members to be brave against various parties that were different from it. In addition to other organizations, the ICP also opposed the legitimate government. The ICP even proposed to replace the Minister of Education and Culture, Artati, because it was considered that her policy was not in line with the party's view. It was illustrated that the ICP's actions were becoming bolder. Their step was not for the progress of the nation and state, but for their interests in seizing power (Pusat-Penerangan-Angkatan-Darat, 1965, p. 16).

It was revealed that in the months before the G30S incidence, the ICP launched a build-up program for its cadres and sympathizers. Members of the ICP's wing organizations were instructed 'to develop revolutionary offences up to a peak, by reinforcing the unity and the mass actions, to eliminate capitalistic bureaucrats, felons, and corruptions, and to fight against evil masters and US imperialism' (Lembaga-Sedjarah-DEPHANKAM, 1966, p. 17). The discourse delivered by the army by narrating the build-up program indicated that the ICP directed its action toward coercion and violence.

The Representation of Anti-ICP Discourse in High School Textbooks

The Chief of Army History Centre, Nugroho Notosusanto, is closely involved in the inclusion of anti-ICP discourses in the school curriculum. In 1974 he was appointed to lead a research team for the renewal of the history curriculum and for writing history textbooks at the Department of Education (McGregor, 2007, p. 153). The team consisted mainly of two staff members of the Army History Center: Yusmar Basri, who acted as the secretary, and Saleh A. Djamhari, a member. The team was also supported by other members consisting of three archaeologists—Hasan Mu'arif Ambary, Edhi Wuryantoro, and D.D. Bintarti—two academic historians—Djokosuryo and A.B. Lapien—and Bambang Sumadio from the Directorate of Museums. They succeeded in arranging the 1975 history curriculum and writing three volumes of obligatory textbooks for high school students. The textbook is a summary of the National History of Indonesia which was published in 1975.



The appointment of Nugroho Notosusanto and his team from the Army History Centre as the core writers of the textbook resulted in the reproduction of anti-ICP discourse composed in 1965. The narrative they built is the most comprehensive among the textbooks published for the 1975 curriculum. In comparison, the textbook written by Z.H. Idris and Tugiyono had the ICP and the G30S incident mentioned in just one paragraph (Idris & Tugiyono, 1979, p. 109). Supartono Widyosiswoyo explained it in 1.5 pages (Widyosiswoyo, 1979, pp. 223-224). On the other hand, the discussion of ICP and G30S conducted by Nugroho Notosusanto's team reached 8 pages (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981, pp. 213-220).

Broadly speaking, the discourse produced through the high school textbooks describes the ICP as a demon, which has a dangerous plan, and its character is devious, deceitful, and that it uses immoral methods. The explanation begins with the dominance of the ICP on the national political stage since the implementation of guided democracy by President Sukarno in 1959. It is illustrated that the failure of the 1948 Madiun rebellion did not dampen the ICP's desire to make Indonesia a communist state. They were trying to divide or infiltrate rival organizations, indoctrinate the army and divert foreign policy into the communist bloc (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981, pp. 200-201). Additionally, it was explained that to realize this dream, the ICP used two methods: parliamentary democratic tactics, and violence. In 1964, documents were found proving that the ICP planned to seize power, but this was denied. The case was not followed up because President Sukarno protected the ICP.

The ICP also used violence in rural areas. The cadres took unilateral actions by seizing agricultural land under the pretext of implementing land reform. It was also illustrated that ICP cadres ganged up against the members of the army and police, as was witnessed in Bandar Betsy (East Sumatra), Boyolali (Central Java), and Jengkol (East Java). However, like the knight in Javanese puppets, the army and the police did not retaliate as it did not want to provoke them further (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981, p. 214).

The new narrative contained in the 1975 curriculum textbook describes the illness of President Sukarno, who was expected to die very soon or was thought to be paralysed. It was explained that the situation made the ICP change its strategy from a parliamentary democracy to the use of force. To carry out its plan, the ICP used the Special Bureau to mobilize its agents to infiltrate the Armed Forces; prominent among them were Brigadier General Supardjo and Lieutenant Colonel Untung from the army, Colonel Sunardi from the navy, and Lieutenant Colonel Anwas from the police (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981, p. 216).

The plan culminated in the carrying out of the G30S, which involved the abduction of the generals led by the army. Although not as cruel as the depiction found in the historiography of 1965, the students were also given a narrative of the *Gerwani* and *Pemuda Rakyat* (the People's Youth) atrocities in Lubang Buaya. It was explained that the officers who were still alive were



tortured with sharp weapons and rifle butts, and so the doctors who examined the bodies found gaping wounds and broken bones, all of which were mentioned in the post-mortem report. Eventually, the officers were bombarded with gunfire, their bodies placed in an old well, and piled with rubbish.

As in the 1965 historiography, the high school textbooks depict Major General Suharto and the army as heroes. Heroification begins with an explanation that, following the legal procedures, Suharto took over as the highest army commander. After that, he led a military operation and very quickly succeeded in overcoming the G30S and in saving the country. This coup proved that the ICP tried to seize the state's power and subsequently tried to replace the Pancasila philosophy with Marxism-Leninism. The success in quelling the G30S rebellion was then commemorated as the Pancasila Power Day every year on October 1.

The final part also addresses the issue of mass murder, although it is not stated as an army initiative. It was explained that during the ICP Rebellion in Madiun in areas of the 1948 mass killings that experienced unilateral actions in the months before the G30S eruption, the people took the initiative to act against the ICP figures. The individual actions were mainly due to President Sukarno's indecision in dealing with the G30S rebellion. The people were worried that with the President's protection, the ICP would rise again to launch its ferocity.

When the curriculum was renewed in 1984, the textbook by Nugroho Notosusanto and friends was reprinted without any changes to the narrative about the G30S. Other textbooks reproduced the discourse contained in the obligatory textbook. For example, the G30S in 1965 was viewed as a continuation of the 1948 Madiun affair. It was said that, under the doctrine of communism, the ICP was trying to seize governmental power. This was proven in the ICP uprising in Madiun at the end of 1948. After the revolt was thwarted, the attempt to seize power was never abandoned, but only used in a different way. The implementation of the guided democracy and President Sukarno's policy allowed the ICP to carry out its ideals (Moedjanto, Sunarti, Kristanto, Haryono, & Padi, 1992, p. 170).

The curriculum renewal in 1994 did not bring much change to the anti-ICP discourse. Although the books written by Nugroho Notosusanto are no longer used as obligatory textbooks, new authors still use it as the main reference. It was explained that communist parties always aim at seizing state power by removing other political forces. Therefore, through its influence on President Sukarno, the ICP eliminated its political opponents. This happened through the banning of the Masyumi Party, the Indonesian Socialist Party, and the People's Deliberation Party (Badrika, 1997). The ICP also levelled the slander that the army formed the Generals Council, which carried out a coup d'état against President Sukarno (Waridah, Sukardi, & Sunarto, 2000). It was said that the Generals Council members, according to secret documents, which was called the Gilchrist documents, had cooperated with neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist countries to invade Indonesia (Sardiman & Kusriyantinah, 1996, p. 74). The



defamation was disproved by the statement that the Generals Council was an advisory group that gives recommendations for the promotion of high-ranking army officers (Sardiman & Kusriyantinah, 1996, p. 75).

In the crackdown on the G30S it was explained that, as a first step, Major General Suharto held a meeting to discuss plans and strategies. The military operation began in the afternoon, at 19.00, under the leadership of Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, who had captured the RRI building and the telecommunications building from the ICP (Sardiman & Kusriyantinah, 1996, p. 78).

On October 3, 1965, at 17:00 a military operation was conducted in the Lubang Buaya area, which was the centre of the ICP activities. At that time, they found a pile of land that was thought to be the burial place of high-ranking army officers. On October 4, the bodies were exhumed in the presence of reporters and were later buried in the Heroes Cemetery on October 5, 1965, to coincide with the TNI Anniversary (Waridah, et al., 2000, pp. 58-59).

Discussion

The production of anti-ICP discourse, which began to emerge in October 1965, has developed into an anti-communist discourse. Prohibition of communism is not only at the level of praxis, such as establishing organizations, but also reaches the level of thought. Mentioning communism in the public sphere always causes a huge counter-reaction. Communism has become a taboo.

The anti-communism attitude in Indonesia is closely related to the production of anti-ICP discourse carried out by the army in 1965. The ICP was demonized as a devious party, cruel, and made up of immoral people. They allowed people to have free sex and even threw sex parties. The stigmatization was reproduced and propagated to students from generation to generation, beginning from the time when Suharto came to power in 1966 until his rule ended in 1998. As a result, the ICP was treated differently from other parties that had rebelled. Like a ghost, the ICP was seen as a latent danger, because it could reascend at any time and threaten Indonesian lives. From this perspective, lives of the Indonesian nation become unhealthy, because of the hate and, at the same time, their worries about the past repeating.

To dispel endless grudges, one solution is to discuss the discourse produced by the army in 1965. One of the important issues to be criticized is the army's decision to term the G30S as a coup. Academic historical studies show that the G30S is the action of several figures that a planned coup d'état (Adam, 2018). John Roosa writes that there are many peculiarities in the explanation of the G30S. Suharto was depicted as forcing an explanation with the power of weapons and not the power of reasoning, so not much of his explanation was worth any consideration. The army has never proven its allegations (Roosa, 2006, p. 95). From that



perspective, the anti-ICP narrative produced between October and December 1965 is more appropriately seen as a political strategy. The ICP's negation was placed in an attempt to win the competition for power among interested groups in the national political stage.

The problem became complicated when the anti-ICP discourse disseminated through the tools of power, as was achieved by the New Order by propagating the stigmatization of the ICP in school textbooks. Borrowing Hayden White's view, the narrative of the ICP and G30S in textbooks became an ideological weapon to destroy the losers and at the same time separate the new generation from their past (White, 2008). From this perspective, the history of Indonesia became history without society and, at the next level, the Indonesian people became a society without history (Nordholt, 2004).

Conclusion

From the results of studies conducted, we can conclude that, in 1965, discourses to stigmatize the ICP as the mastermind of the G30S coup and paint it as demon were produced. The discourses were distributed and promoted by using power tools, included high school history textbooks. The impact is that these discourses influenced people's thinking, and they believed it to be the final truth. From this viewpoint, the historiography of G30S becomes an ideological weapon to separate people from their past.

A solution is to provide a variety of perspectives and discourses, so that people, especially high school students, realize that the historiography is the historians' interpretation. Therefore, every historical narrative needs to be criticized from a methodological viewpoint, so that students can develop their historical thinking and consciousness, socially, culturally, and politically.



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